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I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Defendant is being sued for attorney's fees for
services· rendered by the Plaintiff in the amount
(R 2,3)

of $920.56.

No responsive pleading was filed and a default judgment

was taken (R 17).

The Defendant subsequently filed a motion to

set aside default which was denied.

II.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court denied the Defendant's motion to set
aside default judgment.

III.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks affirmation of the court's order
denying the Defendant's motion to set aside default.

IV.
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Plaintiff differs with the Defendant's Statement
of the Facts in several material respects:
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Plaintiff's Complaint was filed

April 19, 1978

(R 2)

The Defendant was served

April 19, 1978

(R 8)

No responsive pleading was filed and a
judgment by default \las entered against
the Defendant
(R 17)

June 12, 1978

The Defendant subsequently filed a motion
to dismiss on
(R 18)

June 27, 1978

The Defendant filed a motion to set aside
default on
114 days after the default judgment was entered

October 19, 1978

(R 23)

The court denied the Defendant's motion on
(R 54)

October 25, 1978

v.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

A.
The Defendant is precluded from bringing a Motion to
Set Aside Default on the grounds of inadvertance, surprise or
excusable neglect.
The issues in the case are governed by the provision
of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

rhe Rule

provides as follows:

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order or proceeding for the following
reasons:
(1)
mistake,
inadvertence,
surprise,
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or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (7)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1),
(2), (3) or (4), not more than three months after
the judgment, order or procee.ding was entered
or taken.
A motion under this subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation.
This Rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding to to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court.
The procedure for obtaining
any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these Rules or by an independent
action."
Normally, the type of motion filed by Defendant would
be on the grounds of mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable
neglect under subsection (1) of Rule 60(b).

Tnis is particularly

true since it is apparent from Defendant's affidavit that he
failed to ever mail the original of his motion to dismiss to the
court prior to the default date (R page 26, paragraph 11) although
he apparently intended to.

The facts are undisputed that so such
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motion was received timely by the court (R 18) or by Plaintiff
(R 40, 41).

Defendant's motion was received by the court on June

27, 197$ although it bares the date of May 11, 1978 and an
affidavit of mailing of May 11, 1978.

These conflicting dates

render the document suspect.
The Defendant is precluded from alleging mistake,
inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect under subsection
(1) of Rule 60(b) because he didn't file the motion for 114 days
after the default was entered since Rule 60(b) provides:
"The motion shall be made within a reasonable
tine and for reasons (1), (2), (3) or (4),
not more than three months after the judgment,
order or proceedings was entered to taken."
Defendant, therefore, attempts to ground his motion to set aside
default on subsection 7 of the rule which he cannot do.

B.
There is no other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.
Subsection (7) provides:
"Any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment."
The Defendant claims that the Plaintiff is not the real party in
interest and therefore the judgment cannot stand on that ground
(Defendant's Brief 4, 5 and 6).

That this is not a valid ground
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for setting aside a default jugment is demonstrated by two
Utah cases.
In the case of Board of Education of Granite School
District vs. Cox, 14 Utah(2d) 385, 384 P.2d 806, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his descretion
in refusing to set aside a default judgment under subsection
(7) where the Defendant asserted that he thought the summons
was invalid and therefore paid no attention to it.
In that case, the Defendant also claimed that the
judgment was based upon a void contract for the reason that the
contract did not comply with the statute of frauds.

The Supreme

Court held that such an assertion went to the merit of the case
and could not be considered on a motion to set aside a judgment.
Subsection (6) of the Federal Rule 60(b) contains
identical language to that of subsection (7) of the Utah Rules
.of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b).
In discussing this clause (6) in the Federal Rules,
Moore's states:
"It is important to note, however, that clause
(6) contains two very important internal qualifications to its application: first, the motion
must be based upon some reason other than those
stated in clauses (1) - (5); and second, the
other reason urged for relief must be such as to
justify relief.
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"In reference to the first qualification, the
very cast of the Rule and the language of clause
(6) indicate that this residual clause is dealing
with matters not covered in the preceeding five
clauses. Further, the maximum time limitation
of one year (3 months in Utah parense material
added) that applies to clause (1), (2) and (3)
would be meaningless, if after the year period
had run the movant could be granted relief under
clause (6) for reasons covered by clauses (1),
(2) and (3). Klapport so recognized and held.
l1oores Vulur:1e 7, pages 343 and 34<f.
(Klapport
vs. United States [19~9] 335 U.S. 601, 336 U.S.
942, 69 S. Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266)."
The same reasoning applies to this case and since
Defendant should have brought his motion under clause or subsection (1), he cannot bring it under subsection (7).
The Defendant failed to set out either in his motion
or affidavit that he had a meritorious defense.

This showing

is a prerequisite to relief under subsection 7.

Moore's Volume

7 at page 351 states:
"Supplementing the reason for relief, the moving
party must ordinarily show a meritorious claim or
defense. Citing Sebastiana vs. United States
(ND Ohio 1951) 108 F. Supp 278, 15 F.R. Serv
60 b. 29, Case 2, aff'd (CA 6th, 1952) 195
F2d 184, and United States vs. Williams (WD Ark.
1952) 109 F.Supp 456, 18 FR Serv 60 b. 31, Case 1."
The Plaintiff in any event is the real party in interest.
It had merely changed its name.

The same entity at all times

was the Plaintiff and also the entity which rendered the services.
(R 39, 40, 41).
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VI.
CONCLUSION
Since the trial court has broad discretion regarding
the setting aside of default judgments (Warren

vs. Dixon Ranch

~.

123 U.416, 260 P.2d 741 and Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite

~.

14 U. (2d) 52, 376 P.2d 951.

The decision of the lower

court should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of February, 1979.
ROBINSON, GUYON, SUMMERHAYS & BARNES

By~(L/1~
oweTl v . SUillii1eThaS

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I delivered two copies of the
foregoing briei to the Defendant this 23rd ciay of February, 1979
by leaving them at his home address of 1395 Chandler Drive, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84103.
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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-------------------------------------- ----------------------CATHERINE BORGER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16154

LEE RAY BORGER,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce and division of property
based on the respondent, Catherine Borger's Complaint against
the appellant, Lee Ray Borger, and on the appellant's counterclaim against the respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOI<lER COURT
The trial of this action was had without a jury, the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, District Judge, presiding
in the first Judicial District Court, Box Elder County,
State of Utah.

The District Court granted the respondent

a divorce against the appellant and granted the appellant
a uivorce against the respondent.

The District Court also

made a Decree dividing the parties' properties.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have this court affirm the decision
of the trial court judge.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties to this action were married in Elko, Nevada on
the lOth day of March, 1970.
this marriage.

They did not have any children of

The respondent was previously married to a Mr.

Reeder and was divorced from him in 1964.

There were two

children of this marriage who are presently 16 and 18 years of
age whose custody was awarded to the respondent.

(T.4) At that

time, the respondent was awarded the home belonging to the parties
and Mr. Reeder was given a lien for one-half interest in said
home.

(T.24) At the time of the marriage of the parties to this

action, there were no financial obligations against the home
belonging to the respondent except for the lien owing to the
ex-husband.

(T.7) Shortly after their marriage, the appellant

invested $300.00 of the money he had prior to this marriage in
the home for carpet and painting.

(T.7)

In 1972, additional improvements were made to the home.
Two rooms and a carport were added and the home was covered with
aluminum siding and brick.

This was financed with a first

mortgage placed on the home in the sum of $6,500.00.

This

mortgage was paid off by boi:.h the appellant and the rcs]Jonclcnt
from their joint income during the marriage ancl the balance
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owing on said mortgage as of the time of the divorce was
between $3,000.00 and $3,700.00.

(T.9) In 1972, the respondent

contacted her ex-husband and made arrangements to buy out
his interest in the home for the sum of $2,500.00.

The

appellant had nothing to do with this arrangement.

However,

the appellant did give the $2,500.00 to the respondent and
she paid that to her ex-husband.

(T.34) The respondent

places the value of the home at the time at $12,000.00 and
the appellant claims that it was worth $10,000.00.

(T.34, 49)

The appellant claims in his brief and at the time of
the trial that he contributed the labor for the improvements
made on the home in 1972.

However, the appellant admitted

under questioning that during the time he was working on
the home the respondent was maintaining a joint business
owned and operated by the parties and that the respondent
contributed as much time working in the business and at
home as did the appellant in working on the home. {T.52)
The parties went into a joint business known as Ray and
Cathy's Cafe which was opened in 1971 and closed in October,
1977.

This cafe was jointly operated by the parties during

their marriage.

(T.l2)

The appellant also admits that any

and all costs of improving the home were obligations against
the home that have been paid off with joint income or are
still owing against said home.

(T.53)
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During the marriage, the parties purchased a 19-foot
mobile home which was disposed of by the appellant in 1978
and from which he received $3,000.00 which he reinvested in
a truck and camper.

Six Hundred Dollars of the respondent's

money from an inheritance was invested in the mobile home as
well as the payments made on it out of the joint income earned
by the parties during their marriage.

(T.l3, 14, 16) The parties

also owned a 1966 Hydro-Swift 16-foot boat which the respondent
values at $1,500.00 and a 1973 Pontiac which the respondent
values at $950.00.

The furniture belonging to the parties was

owned by the respondent prior to the marriage with the exception
of a TV, washer and dryer.

(T. 15, 16) During the time the

parties were married, the appellant received the use of the
home and furniture belonging to the respondent free of any
charge except for the labor and the payments made on the
mortgage incurred for the new improvements.

(T.7, 35)

Judge Christoffersen awarded to the appellant the truck
and camper and the boat.

The court awarded to the respondent

the 1973 Pontiac and the furniture.

The respondent was also

awarded the home subject to a lien in favor of the appellant
in the sum of $1,225.00.
Judge Christoffersen found that the appellant did not
purchase a one-half interest in the home 1vhc>n he contribuLcc_1
the $2,500.00 which was used to pay off the ex-husband's lien.
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He also found that the joint monies used to retire the
mortgage and the joint effort which went into improving
the horne was offset by the free use of the horne given
to the appellant during the marriage.

The court found

that the appellant should receive a credit for the
$2,225.00 paid to the respondent's ex-husband, for the
$300.00 invested in the carpet and paint during the time of
the marriage and for one-half of the value of the automobile
which would be $425.00 making a total of $3,225.00.

The

court found that the respondent was entitled to a credit
of one-half of the equity obtained from the sale of the
mobile home and invested into the appellant's truck and
camper amounting to $1,500.00 and one-half of the equity
in the boat as estimated by the appellant amounting to
$500.00 for a total of $2,000.00 credit.

The court then

deducted the $2,000.00 from the $3,225.00 and gave the
appellant a lien against the horne in the sum of $1,225.00 (T.58-62)
ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION WAS SUPPORTED BY THE
I.VEIGHT OF EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL.
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the court
awarded the home to the respondent with a lien in favor
of the appellant in the sum of $1,225.00.

The court

awarded to the appellant the truck and camper which the
court valued at $3,000.00 and the boat which the court
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valued

at

The respondent was awarded the auto-

$1,000.00.

mobile which was valued at $950.00 and the furniture which she
owned prior Lo the marriage.

The court indicated that no value

had been placed on the TV which was purchased during the marriage,
and consequently, the court was unable to use that value at
reaching any judgment.

The court did not award the respondent

any alimony, but did require the appellant to pay the respondent's
attorney's fees in the sum of $350.00.

The evidence indicated

that the appellant had a take-home income of approximately
$700.00 per month and that the respondent had a take-home income
of approximately $550.00 per month.
Counsel for the appellant in his brief, claims that the
trial court's judgment was improper because the appellant purchased a one-half interest in the home in 1972.

This position

of the appellant is totally unsupported by the evidence.

The

evidence is clear that the respondent negotiated with her
ex-husband and was able to convince him to accept the sum of
$2,500.00 for his one-half interest in the home.
the home was worth approximately $12,000.00.

At that time,

Therefore, it is

obvious that the $2,500.00 was not for the purpose of purchasing
the one-half interest in the home.

The appellant did advance

the money that was used to pay off the ex-husband.

The respondent

has always acknowledged that the appellant was cntillt:d to a credit
for the money he advanced.

At the ti

the ex-husband gave
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up his interest in the home, the deed was placed in the joint
names of the appellant and the respondent.

The testimony at

the trial was that at that time, the parties had no reason
to believe their marriage was in trouble and were not
concerned about who owned what.

Probably about 90% of

married couples in the state of Utah place their home in
joint tenancy and it cannot be concluded from this that the
appellant was acquiring a one-half interest.

It would be

ridiculous to believe that the respondent would be willing
to give the appellant a $6,000.00 interest for $2,510.00.
The appellant also contends that he should have an
interest
the home.

in the home because he performed certain work on
It is true that the appellant, in 1972, performed

labor on the home that made a significant improvement in the
home.

However, during this time, the appellant and the

respondent were l'lakin<J their living frol'l a cafe which was
jointly owned by them.

In order for the appellant to have

enough time to work on the home, the•respondent had to work
extended hours on the job for which she received no additional
compensation.

The appellant reluctantly admitted at the

time of the trial that the respondent had contributed as
much time in running the business and taking care of the
home as he dil1 in runninc1 the business and doing the work
on the home.

(T.52, line 15) It should also be noted that

the appellant lived in the home from 1970 until the time
of the divorce in 1978.

During these eight

yea~s

he used
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the home and the furniture belonging to the respondent without
making any payments whatsoever with the exception of the work
he

performed and the retirement of the first mortgage which

was paid out of the monies earned jointly by the parties.
It is the position of the respondent that the

trial

court was totally justified in the decision that it made and
in fact did make a fair

an~

equitable distribution of the

property belonging to the parties.

The apoellant has contri-

buted $2,800.00 in cash plus some services for a period of
eight years and yet wishes to walk away with one-half of the
assets acquired by the respondent prior to the marriage and
with a majority of the assets acquired by the parties during
the marriage.

This certainly would not be an equitable result

and consequently the respondent prays for the court to U?hold
the lower court's decision.
CONCLUSION
The lower court's decision was totally supported by the
evidence and consequently should be upheld by this court.
DATED this

day of April, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to the attorney
for the Plaintiff-Appellant, Jack H. Molgard, Esq., at
P. 0. Box 461, Brigham City, UT 84302, on this the

o{0f~

day of April, 1979.

wj~
f2£brxwMAfl6
JEANNINE C.
DAMEvlORTH

Secretary to Robert A. Echard
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